New: a threat-model-first guide to choosing your network defence, plus the nym-smoldvpn dVPN package and nym-swizzle sender hygiene.
Network
Threat Model
Configurations
Hybrid (recommended)

Hybrid (recommended)

✅IP hidden · P1@L2✅Req-unlink · P2@L2◐Local net · P1@L3L◐Global net · P1@L3G✅Fast
L2The destination✅P1✅P2

Sees

  • Bulk side: a pseudonymous profile
  • Sensitive side: arrival timing on the mixnet path

Can't see

  • Client IP
  • Which sensitive request belongs to which bulk session

Residual / countermeasure

  • The two streams share no session state (different transports, different IPs). Sensitive requests are unlinkable to the bulk profile and to each other via per-request rotation and decorrelated timing.
L3LLocal network observer◐P1

Sees

  • That the client uses the bulk transport (fingerprintable)

Can't see

  • Sensitive requests (routed over the mixnet, unobservable)
L3GGlobal network observer◐P1

Sees

  • The bulk flow (correlatable)

Can't see

  • Sensitive requests

Residual / countermeasure

  • Bulk is correlatable but uninformative; the hybrid makes bulk uninformative rather than invisible.

Pros

  • Client IP hidden, fast bulk transfer, and timing-obfuscated sensitive requests in one design

Cons / mitigations

  • Needs a per-request-class transport split and coordination on shared exit sets

Fit

  • The recommended architecture: fast private bulk + timing-safe sensitive requests

Verdicts and the latency implied by the path are an illustrative model, not measured values.

Mixnet · rotating exitEnd to end